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NOTES
THE  CURIOUS  CASE  OF SEMINOLE  ROCK :
REVISITING  JUDICIAL  DEFERENCE  TO
AGENCY  INTERPRETATIONS  OF  THEIR
AMBIGUOUS  REGULATIONS
Peter M. Torstensen, Jr.*
INTRODUCTION
The Constitution created a governing structure designed to safeguard
citizens from the concentration of government power.1  To create this struc-
ture, the framers relied upon three primary mechanisms—the separation of
government powers, a system of checks and balances, and the lawmaking pro-
cess.  In particular, the framers vested the legislative, executive, and judicial
powers in separate branches to provide distinct boundaries for each power.2
However, they permitted enough interference to equip each branch with
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2016; Bachelor of Arts in
Economics, UCLA, 2002.  I would like to thank Professor Patricia Bellia for her patient
guidance and direction, and my wife, Katie Torstensen, for her constant and steadfast
support.  Finally, I would like to thank the members of the Notre Dame Law Review for their
expert work and fastidious attention to detail.  All errors are mine.
1 Some argue that this protection even extends to seemingly benign assertions of
authority. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 594 (1952)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“The accretion of dangerous power does not come in a day.
It does come, however slowly, from the generative force of unchecked disregard of the
restrictions that fence in even the most disinterested assertion of authority.”).
2 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (vesting the legislative power in Congress); U.S. CONST.
art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (vesting the executive power in the President of the United States); U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 1 (vesting the judicial power in the Supreme Court and inferior courts
established by Congress); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 245 (James Madison) (Law-
rence Goldman ed., 2008) (“It is agreed on all sides that the powers properly belonging to
one of the departments ought not to be directly and completely administered by either of
the other departments.”).
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power to defend against encroachments from the other branches.3  These
checks and balances secure sufficient separation by relying on the ambition
of men to preserve their own power.4  In addition, the legislative process
requires that, in order to become binding law, a bill must pass both houses of
Congress and be presented to the President for approval5—a process that, in
practice, is quite burdensome.6  This process reflects a value judgment by the
framers that “the legislative power of the Federal Government be exercised
in accord with a single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered,
procedure.”7
The modern administrative state is predicated on a normative judgment
that is often in direct opposition to individual liberty interests—namely,
there is a distinct preference for efficient governance in light of modern exi-
gencies.8  Out of these efficiency-based concerns arose judicially constructed
doctrines of deference to agency decisionmaking.  In particular, courts defer
to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of ambiguities in the statutes they
administer—“Chevron deference”9—and the regulations they promulgate—
“Seminole Rock deference.”10  Both Chevron and Seminole Rock alleviate some of
the administrative burden on agencies by giving them significant latitude in
their interpretive decisions, subject to two general requirements: (1) there
must be an ambiguity in the statute or regulation, and (2) the interpretation
3 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 257 (James Madison) (Lawrence Goldman ed., 2008)
(arguing that defenses needed to be given to the respective branches that were “commen-
surate to the danger of attack”); id. (“But the great security against a gradual concentration
of the several powers in the same department consists in giving to those who administer
each department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist
encroachments of the others.”).
4 See id. (arguing that separation would be achieved by relying on “[a]mbition . . . to
counteract ambition,” which involved empowering the respective branches to resist the
encroachments of the others).
5 The legislative process requires adherence to the bicameral and presentment
requirements of Article I, § 7. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cls. 1–3.  First, the Constitution
vests the legislative power in Congress, which consists of a Senate and a House of Repre-
sentatives.  Second, it requires that a bill must be passed by both houses and then
presented to the President.  Finally, it requires that the President either approve the bill—
after which it becomes law—or veto the bill—after which it only becomes law if repassed by
two thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives.
6 See Schoolhouse Rock!, I’m Just a Bill, YOUTUBE (Sept. 1, 2008) https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=tyeJ55o3El0.
7 INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983).
8 See Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1223 n.6 (2015) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (quoting Woodrow Wilson, The Study of Administration, 2 POL. SCI. Q. 197,
214–15 (1887)) (referencing Woodrow Wilson’s argument that concerns regarding the
administrative state are found in the inability to separate what is necessary to preserve
liberty from what is merely incidental, not in the general intrusions into personal liberty).
9 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842–44 (1984).
10 See Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 413–14 (1945). Seminole Rock
deference is often referred to as Auer deference.  For consistency, this Note exclusively
refers to the doctrine as the Seminole Rock doctrine.
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of the statute or regulation must be reasonable.11 Chevron is based on a pre-
sumption of congressional intent.12  That is, when Congress delegates
authority to an agency to execute a statutory program, they intend for the
agency to resolve ambiguities in the statute.13 Seminole Rock appears to be an
obvious corollary—if Congress intends for an agency to clarify ambiguities in
a statute Congress drafted, surely Congress also intends the agency to clarify
any ambiguities in its own regulations.14  However, the Seminole Rock princi-
ple suffers from some significant constitutional infirmities.
At a closer look, Seminole Rock deference violates the principle of separa-
tion of powers and incentivizes troubling exercises of agency gamesmanship.
When an agency interprets an ambiguity in a statute they are charged with
administering, the legislative branch effectively relinquishes power to the
agency, or executive branch, to resolve the ambiguity in pursuit of a reasona-
ble regulatory program.15  However, when an agency interprets an ambiguity
in a regulation it promulgated, expands the power of the executive branch
by reserving for themselves the authority to interpret the rule they
authored.16  This encourages agencies to enact vague regulations to avoid
the inconveniences of agency rulemaking and, at a later time, issue interpre-
tations to achieve their regulatory ends—interpretations that bind the courts
so long as they are not “plainly erroneous.”17  This problem is exacerbated by
the procedural requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),
which provides “the maximum procedural requirements” that courts may
impose on agencies engaged in rulemaking.18  While the APA obligates agen-
cies that engage in rulemaking to follow the extensive notice-and-comment
11 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–44; Seminole Rock, 325 U.S. at 413–14.
12 Matthew C. Stephenson & Miri Pogoriler, Seminole Rock’s Domain, 79 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1449, 1449–50 (2011) (noting that this “presumption is in turn grounded in a set of
pragmatic considerations—most notably expertise, accountability, and uniformity—that
are thought to favor administrative over judicial construction”).
13 See John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency Interpreta-
tions of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 621–23 (1996) (discussing congressional
authority to delegate legislative discretion to administrative agencies).
14 Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 131 S. Ct. 2254, 2266 (2011) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring) (“On the surface, it seems to be a natural corollary—indeed, an a fortiori applica-
tion—of the rule that we will defer to an agency’s interpretation of the statute it is charged
with implementing.  But it is not.” (citation omitted)).
15 See id. (arguing that deference to an agency’s interpretation of a statute “effectively
cedes power to the Executive”).
16 See id. (arguing that “when an agency promulgates an imprecise rule, it leaves to
itself the implementation of that rule, and thus the initial determination of the rule’s
meaning”).
17 See id. (noting that deference to an agency’s interpretations of its own rules
“encourages the agency to enact vague rules which give it the power . . . to do what it
pleases”).
18 See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–59, 701–06 (2012); Vt. Yankee
Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 524 (1978).
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requirements,19 it expressly exempts interpretive rules from these onerous
provisions.20  While the contours of interpretive rules are imprecise, they
have the potential to impose obligations upon citizens just as burdensome as
legislative rules.21
Recognizing these issues, some courts have enacted procedural safe-
guards to protect against agency abuse of the interpretive rules exemption.22
Agencies can use interpretive rules to interpret new regulations, old regula-
tions, and to reinterpret previously settled interpretations.23  In Paralyzed Vet-
erans of America v. D.C. Arena L.P., the D.C. Circuit attempted to protect
against burdens imposed on affected parties by agency reinterpretations.24
Paralyzed Veterans held that when an agency significantly revises a previously
settled interpretation of a regulation, it has in effect, amended the rule with-
out notice and comment, which is prohibited under the APA.25  While the
aim of Paralyzed Veterans was noble, the Supreme Court held in Perez v. Mort-
gage Bankers Ass’n that requiring interpretive rules, even those that are signifi-
cant revisions, to go through notice and comment violates the clear text of
the APA and the obligation that reviewing courts not impose additional pro-
19 The APA prescribes the process for rulemaking at 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)–(c).  The pro-
cedure calls for three steps.  First, the agency is required to issue a “[g]eneral notice of
proposed rule making,” which is usually published in the Federal Register. Id. § 553(b).
Second, if notice is required, the agency must give interested parties the opportunity to
participate in the process by providing an opportunity for comment. Id. § 553(c).  Finally,
when the agency promulgates the final rule, they are required to include in the rule “a
concise general statement of their basis and purpose.” Id.
20 The APA exempts “interpretative rules,” more commonly referred to as interpretive
rules, from the general rulemaking process. See id. § 553(b)(A).  For consistency, this Note
uses the term “interpretive rules.”
21 See Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1210 (2015) (Alito, J., concur-
ring) (noting the concern created by “the exploitation by agencies of the uncertain bound-
ary between legislative and interpretive rules”); id. at 1212 (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting
that “if an interpretive rule gets deference, the people are bound to obey it on pain of
sanction, no less surely than they are bound to obey substantive rules”).  While the line
between legislative and interpretive rules is imprecise, this Note assumes that even minor
“interpretations” have the capacity to substantively affect the rights and interests of affected
parties.  Thus, the concerns about Seminole Rock will remain wherever that line is drawn.
22 See Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579, 586 (1997) (requir-
ing notice and comment for interpretations of previously settled ambiguities that signifi-
cantly revise the regulation), abrogated by Mortg. Bankers, 135 S. Ct. 1199 (2015); see also
Mortg. Bankers, 135 S. Ct. at 1212 (Scalia, J., concurring) (calling the Paralyzed Veterans
doctrine “a courageous . . . attempt to limit the mischief”).
23 This becomes particularly troubling when an agency reinterprets a regulation with a
previously settled meaning, as it can impose undue burdens on affected parties who
ordered their conduct based on the prior interpretation.  These reinterpretations, as
noted in Mortgage Bankers, effectively create “new regulation[s].” See Mortg. Bankers, 135 S.
Ct. at 1221 (Thomas, J., concurring).
24 Id. at 1209 (discussing the potential for abuse that Paralyzed Veterans was designed to
address).
25 Alaska Prof’l Hunters Ass’n, Inc. v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 177 F.3d 1030, 1034 (D.C.
Cir. 1999) (citing Paralyzed Veterans, 117 F.3d at 586).
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cedural requirements on agency action beyond those provided for in the
APA.26 Mortgage Bankers has important—albeit indirect—consequences for
the future of Seminole Rock.  Namely, the repudiation of the Paralyzed Veterans
doctrine opens the door for agencies to issue interpretive rules to accomplish
substantive revisions in regulatory policy.27  This increases the possibility that
the Court will soon be presented with opportunities to reconsider the merits
of Seminole Rock.  This is important, as there now appear to be as many as four
Justices willing to consider the possibility of either overruling or significantly
limiting Seminole Rock—Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas,
and Alito.28
Seminole Rock deference warrants reconsideration as it is based on ques-
tionable constitutional and pragmatic foundations.  This Note argues that
courts should provide a meaningful check on agency interpretations by
engaging in de novo review of agency resolutions of regulatory ambiguities.
Part I explores the development of the Seminole Rock doctrine, from its ques-
tionable doctrinal foundations and rapid expansion to the developing con-
cerns regarding its continued validity.  In addition, Part I explains the variety
of forms that agency interpretations can take, including legal briefs, amicus
briefs, and internal memoranda, and discusses their impact in expanding the
scope of Seminole Rock deference.  Part II considers the various justifications
for, and concerns with, Seminole Rock deference.  In particular, Part II looks at
two primary arguments offered in support of Seminole Rock—the agency’s spe-
cial insight and institutional competence—and assesses their merits in light
of Seminole Rock’s primary concerns—separation of powers and agency games-
manship.  Finally, Part III considers the merits of Professor Manning’s argu-
ment that Seminole Rock should be replaced with Skidmore deference,29 and
concludes, despite the potential efficiency costs, that the Court should aban-
don Seminole Rock and engage in de novo review of agency interpretations of
their regulations.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF SEMINOLE ROCK DEFERENCE
A. The Genesis of Deference to Agency Interpretations of Agency Regulations
During World War II and for the purpose of “stabiliz[ing] prices . . . and
other disruptive practices resulting from abnormal market conditions,” Con-
gress passed the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 (the Act), which dele-
26 Mortg. Bankers, 135 S. Ct. at 1206 (citing Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res.
Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 524 (1978)).
27 See id. at 1212 (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that giving interpretive rules defer-
ence provides broad powers to agencies to accomplish their objectives without the burden
of notice-and-comment procedures).
28 See infra notes 80–83, 90–98, 102–16 and accompanying text.
29 See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (giving weight to an agency’s
interpretation based on the “thoroughness evident in the its consideration, the validity of
its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors
which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control”).
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gated authority to the Price Administrator to establish maximum prices for
commodities by regulation or order.30  Three years later, in Bowles v. Seminole
Rock & Sand Co., the Supreme Court was called upon to determine the
proper interpretation and application of a price regulation—Maximum Price
Regulation No. 188 (the Regulation)—issued by the Administrator pursuant
to his authority under the Act.31  The Regulation provided that any seller of
articles subject to the Regulation—which included sellers of crushed stone—
could not charge a higher price than the price which they charged during
the base period of March 1, 1942, through March 31, 1942.32  The Court was
tasked with determining the meaning of the phrase: “Highest price charged
during March 1942.”33
Seminole Rock & Sand Co. manufactured crushed stone subject to the
Regulation.34  In October 1941, Seminole Rock contracted with Seaboard Air
Line Railway to provide crushed stone on demand at sixty cents per ton, but
the stone was not delivered until March 1942.35  In January 1942, Seminole
Rock contracted with V.P. Loftis Co. to provide crushed stone on demand at
$1.50 per ton, but Loftis only demanded a small portion of the stone during
January—more deliveries were eventually made to Loftis in August 1942.36
After the effective date of the Regulation, Seminole Rock entered into new
contracts with Seaboard to sell crushed stone at eighty-five cents and one
dollar per ton, but the Price Administrator brought an action to enjoin Semi-
nole Rock from violating the Regulation, alleging that the highest price that
Seminole Rock could sell the crushed stone for was the sixty cents per ton it
had previously charged Seaboard.37  In particular, the Court had to deter-
mine if “highest price charged” meant that the seller had to charge and
deliver the product during March 1942 or if it just required an actual delivery
of the product during March 1942.38  If the Court found that the product
had to be charged and delivered during March 1942, the ceiling price for
Seminole Rock would likely be the outstanding offering price of $1.50 per
ton to Loftis.39  If, however, the Court determined that the product only
needed to be delivered during March 1942, the ceiling price would be sixty
cents per ton as Seminole Rock had delivered crushed stone to Seaboard
during March of 1942 at that price.40  The problem before the Court
appeared to be a common interpretive issue, but the Court seized the oppor-
30 Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-421, §§ 1(a), 2(a), 56 Stat. 23,
23–24.  The Act created the Office of Price Administration, and placed it under the direc-
tion of the Price Administrator. Id. § 201, 56 Stat. at 29.
31 Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 411 (1945).
32 Id. at 413.
33 Id. at 414 (internal quotation marks omitted).




38 Id. at 415.
39 Id.
40 Id.
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tunity to opine on the respective roles of courts and administrative agencies
in determining the meaning of ambiguous agency regulations.41
Without citing prior precedent or offering any constitutional justifica-
tion, the Court announced a new approach to evaluating agency interpreta-
tions of their ambiguous regulations:
[When the interpretation at issue] involves an [agency’s] interpretation of
an administrative regulation a court must necessarily look to the administra-
tive construction of the regulation if the meaning of the words used is in
doubt.  The intention of Congress or the principles of the Constitution in some
situations may be relevant in the first instance in choosing between various
constructions.  But the ultimate criterion is the administrative interpretation, which
becomes of controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the
regulation.42
  The problem with this ipse dixit pronouncement was that it served as a
supplementary principle, rather than as a dispositive one, and thus had no
meaningful influence on the outcome of the case.43  Instead, the Court
engaged in what was essentially de novo review of the regulation, concluded
that the ceiling price was the “highest price charged [for an article delivered]
during March[ ] 1942,” and then noted that their reading of the regulation
“and the consistent administrative interpretation . . . thus compel[led] th[is] con-
clusion.”44  Thus, the Court introduced a novel approach to reviewing an
agency’s resolution of a regulatory ambiguity and then concluded that its
new approach was unnecessary to determining the meaning of the regula-
tion, which essentially rendered the discussion about the “controlling weight”
given to “the administrative interpretation” mere dictum.45  The subsequent
expansion of the Seminole Rock doctrine is particularly concerning given the
shaky ground on which it stands.
B. The Shaping of Seminole Rock Deference
For over half a century, Seminole Rock and its unstable foundation devel-
oped outside the watchful eye of the Supreme Court and the academic com-
munity.46  In fact, after Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
41 See id. at 414–17.
42 Id. at 413–14 (emphases added).
43 The Court evaluated the terms of the regulation and reached a conclusion on its
own before noting that the administrative interpretation removed any doubts regarding the
conclusion it reached.  Rather than deciding the outcome, the newly minted principle of
deference merely supported it. See id. at 414–18 (interpreting the provisions of the regula-
tion and determining that the most sensible conclusion was that the price ceiling was
determined based on actual delivery of the products); id. at 417 (noting that any doubts
regarding their conclusion “[we]re removed by reference to the administrative construc-
tion of this method of computing the ceiling price”).
44 Id. at 418 (emphasis added).
45 See id. at 414.  As the Court’s independent construction of the regulation resolved
the issue, the discussion about deference was essentially dictum.
46 See Manning, supra note 13, at 613–14 (discussing the vastly different treatment of
Chevron and Seminole Rock by the legal community).
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Inc.47 was decided, scholarly ire was reserved for discussions regarding the
legitimacy of Chevron deference while Seminole Rock deference went largely
unnoticed.48  Between 1945 and 1996, the Supreme Court cited Seminole Rock
for its proposition regarding deference twenty times—five of these citations,
however, were in dissent.49  During this time, the Court provided a suffi-
ciently reasoned discussion of the justifications for deference to agency inter-
pretations in only a fraction of the cases that cited Seminole Rock.50  Prior to
Professor Manning’s seminal article, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Defer-
ence to Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, the Court and the academic com-
munity seemed to consider Seminole Rock deference a necessary, if not
47 Chevron U.S.A. Inc., v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
48 Manning, supra note 13, at 613–14 (noting that “[e]xhaustive academic commen-
tary has scrutinized Chevron’s legitimacy,” while “Seminole Rock deference . . . has long been
one of the least worried-about principles of administrative law”).
49 This result was reached by searching “Citing References” under the Seminole Rock
case in Westlaw.  The results were limited as follows: I selected “Cases,” under “Jurisdiction”
selected “Federal” and further limited the results to “Supreme Court,” and, finally, entered
a “Date Range” of “6/5/1945 to 2/18/1997” to capture the period between Seminole Rock
and Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997).  This search yielded twenty-two results, two of
which did not cite Seminole Rock for the principle of deference—M. Kraus & Bros., Inc. v.
United States, 327 U.S. 614 (1946), and United States v. Swank, 449 U.S. 814 (1980) (denying
motion for additional time for oral argument and for divided argument).
Five of the remaining twenty results were cited in dissent.  Shalala v. Guernsey Mem’l
Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 103 (1995) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Seminole Rock with
approval but finding the interpretation at issue either “plainly erroneous or inconsistent
with the regulation” (quoting Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 45 (1993))); Dir.,
Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs v. Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. 267, 297 (1994)
(Souter, J., dissenting); Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846, 865 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting);
United States v. Swank, 451 U.S. 571, 589 (1981) (White, J., dissenting); Peters v. Hobby,
349 U.S. 331, 355 & n.4 (1955) (Reed, J., dissenting).  Thus, while the five cases in dissent
cited Seminole Rock’s deference language with approval, Seminole Rock was only relied upon
to resolve fifteen cases in more than fifty years.
50 In the cases relying on Seminole Rock, the Court often applied the principle of defer-
ence in a less than critical fashion. See, e.g., Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S.
504, 512 (1994) (observing that the Court’s task was not to select the option that would
best serve the regulatory purpose); Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S.
332, 359 (1989) (uncritically deferring to the interpretation of the agency); Ehlert v.
United States, 402 U.S. 99, 105 (1971) (finding the Court “obligated to regard as control-
ling a reasonable, consistently applied administrative interpretation”); United States v. City
of Chicago, 400 U.S. 8, 10 (1970) (uncritically deferring to the interpretation of the
agency); INS v. Stanisic, 395 U.S. 62, 72 (1969) (finding the consistently applied agency
interpretation dispositive of the case without discussion of the rationale for deference).
These results were often reached without much discussion and under the assumption that
Seminole Rock clearly controlled—not once did the Court suggest that the “plainly errone-
ous” language was dictum.
It seems abundantly clear that the first fifty years of Seminole Rock deference did not
garner the same attention in the Court or the academic community as the first thirty years
of Chevron—despite Chevron’s arguably more stable constitutional foundation. See Man-
ning, supra note 13, at 625–27 (discussing the constitutional justifications for Chevron).
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uncontroversial, expediency in the practice of administrative law.51  The lack
of attention, however, did nothing to prevent the doctrine from significantly
expanding its reach.52  In fact, the Court’s largely unquestioned adherence
to the Seminole Rock principle allowed it to grow from strongly worded dictum
to a firmly-entrenched tenet of administrative law.53  Like the small spark
that eventually lays waste to the forest, the initial applications of Seminole Rock
deference left little cause for concern, as it often served to merely supple-
ment the Court’s conclusion.54  However, as the doctrine began to spread, its
application became more and more troubling.  The remainder of this Part
will evaluate the expansion of the Seminole Rock doctrine and the Court’s
moderated efforts to limit its reach.
1. The Steady Expansion of Seminole Rock
For the first twenty years after it was decided, Seminole Rock made little
noise.  In fact, the Court did not apply Seminole Rock to determine the out-
come of a case until 1965, when it decided Udall v. Tallman.55  After deter-
mining that they “show[ed] great deference to the interpretation given the
statute by the officers or agency charged with its administration,” the Court
uncritically asserted that “deference [was] even more clearly in order” when
“the construction of an administrative regulation rather than a statute [wa]s
51 See Manning, supra note 13, at 616–17 (conceding that “Seminole Rock may be an
understandable reaction to the exigencies of modern regulatory governance” but arguing
that “one must assess [Seminole Rock’s] validity in light of the incentives it supplies to an
agency engaged in rulemaking”).
52 For the first twenty-five years following Seminole Rock, the federal circuit and district
courts cited it ninety-eight times.  This result was found by searching “Citing References,”
as described above, supra note 49, and using the “Date Range” of “6/5/1945 to 12/31/
1970.”  The attention given to Seminole Rock during the next twenty-five years was far more
substantial than the previous twenty-five years—lower courts cited it 462 times.  This result
was found by searching “Citing References,” as described above, supra note 49, and using
the “Date Range” of “1/1/1971 to 2/18/1997.”
53 When the Court announced the Seminole Rock principle, they referred to the “ulti-
mate criterion” of the administrative interpretation, which was to be given “controlling”
effect.  Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945).  The Court cited no
authority for this principle. Id. at 413–14.  By the mid-1990s, however, members of the
Court seemed compelled to affirm its validity, even in dissent. See Guernsey Mem’l Hosp., 514
U.S. at 108 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“I take seriously our obligation to defer to an
agency’s reasonable interpretation of its own regulation[ ] . . . .”).
54 See Russell L. Weaver & Thomas A. Schweitzer, Deference to Agency Interpretations of
Regulations: A Post-Chevron Assessment, 22 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 411, 414 (1992) (arguing
that there was doubt regarding the extent to which courts adhered to deference standards
as courts often used deference principles “in a perfunctory manner”).
55 The only two Supreme Court cases citing Seminole Rock prior to Udall v. Tallman, 380
U.S. 1 (1965), were M. Kraus & Bros., Inc. v. United States, 327 U.S. 614 (1946), and Peters v.
Hobby, 349 U.S. 331 (1955). Kraus cited Seminole Rock for a different proposition, see Kraus,
327 U.S. at 622 (citing for procedural requirement), and Peters cited Seminole Rock in dis-
sent, see Peters, 349 U.S. at 355 & n.4 (Reed, J., dissenting).
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[at] issue.”56  The Court, however, provided some explanation regarding fac-
tors that would render an interpretation reasonable, finding that a consist-
ently applied interpretation was one such factor.57  This mild restraint by the
Court was significant, as it chipped away at the incredibly broad deference
language from Seminole Rock.58  When the Court decided Ford Motor Credit Co.
v. Milhollin in 1985, it was presented with the question of whether the Federal
Reserve Board’s interpretation of a regulation governing disclosure require-
ments for consumer lending under the Truth in Lending Act was reasona-
ble.59  The Court employed traditional tools of statutory construction and
determined that the regulation was ambiguous.60  More importantly, the
Court felt obligated to accept the agency’s “expert judgment” regarding the
meaning of the regulation, and while there was more than one acceptable
interpretation, the Court declined to independently construe the regula-
tion.61  The decision not to independently construe the regulation was
important, as the Court ever so slightly placed additional interpretive ques-
tions outside its reach on account of the “broad experience” of the agency
with consumer credit practices.62  Just like that, the reach of Seminole Rock
deference began to take on a life of its own.  It was later extended to apply to
an agency interpretation of another agency’s regulations,63 and it was
56 Udall, 380 U.S. at 16.
57 Id. at 17–18 (determining that the consistently applied interpretation of the Secre-
tary warranted deference as long as it was not unreasonable because it “had . . . been a
matter of public record and discussion”); see also Ehlert v. United States, 402 U.S. 99, 105
(1971) (deferring to “a reasonable, consistently applied administrative interpretation” (cit-
ing INS v. Stanisic, 395 U.S. 62, 72 (1969))).
58 The language in Seminole Rock bears repeating.  The Court declared that “[t]he
intention of Congress or the principles of the Constitution in some situations may be relevant . . .
in choosing between various constructions.  But the ultimate criterion is the administrative
interpretation . . . .” Seminole Rock, 325 U.S. at 414 (emphases added).  This seems back-
wards.  Certainly, if the principles of the Constitution are not implicated by an administra-
tive construction of an ambiguous regulation, these principles should not factor into the
Court’s eventual determination.  If, however, constitutional principles are relevant to the
case, the Court’s construction of the regulation does not bow to an administrative interpre-
tation. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution . . . shall be the supreme Law of the
Land . . . .”).
59 Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 557 (1980).
60 Id. at 559–62.
61 See id. at 568–70 (declining to independently construe the statute on the grounds
that the Court would be “embark[ing] on a voyage without a compass”).
62 Id. at 568–69 (finding that “[a]dministrative agencies are simply better suited than
courts to engage in . . . a process” of evaluating and regulating consumer credit practices).
63 See Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 697–99 (1991) (finding that the
Secretary of Labor’s interpretation of the interim regulations issued by the then-existent
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) was entitled deference).  While the
Court never specifically referenced Seminole Rock, it deferred to the Secretary of Labor’s
construction of a regulation issued by HEW—an application of Seminole Rock deference in
substance, if not in form.  See id.
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applied outside the traditional context of administrative regulations—the
world of criminal sentencing.64
During the mid-1990s, the Court decided two cases that revealed devel-
oping cracks in the foundation of Seminole Rock.  In Thomas Jefferson University
v. Shalala65 and Shalala v. Guernsey Memorial Hospital,66 six different Justices
joined two separate dissenting opinions, criticizing the manner in which the
Court extended deference to the respective administrative interpretations—
although neither dissenting opinion suggested a departure from Seminole
Rock.67  Just two short years later, in Auer v. Robbins, the Court reaffirmed
their fidelity to the Seminole Rock principle.68  Even though the Secretary’s
interpretation of the regulation was first submitted to the Court in the form
of a legal brief, the Court determined that this did not render the interpreta-
tion unworthy of deference, as it was “in no sense a ‘post hoc rationalizatio[n]’
advanced by an agency seeking to defend past agency action against
attack.”69  The Court was satisfied that the Secretary’s interpretation
“reflect[ed] the agency’s fair and considered judgment on the matter in
question.”70  In reaching this conclusion, the Court added an additional
64 Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 44–45 (1993) (arguing that the Sentencing
Commission’s commentary on its sentencing guidelines was similar to an agency’s interpre-
tation of its own regulations and finding that the commentary was entitled to Seminole Rock
deference).
65 512 U.S. 504 (1994).
66 514 U.S. 87 (1995).
67 In Guernsey Memorial Hospital, Justices Scalia, Souter, and Thomas joined Justice
O’Connor in dissent, see id. at 102 (O’Connor, J., dissenting), while Justices Stevens,
O’Connor, and Ginsburg joined Justice Thomas in his dissent in Thomas Jefferson University,
512 U.S. at 518 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  Both dissenting opinions only criticized the par-
ticular application of Seminole Rock deference. See Guernsey Mem’l Hosp., 514 U.S. at 108–10
(O’Connor, J., dissenting) (objecting to the Secretary’s reliance on an informal policy
manual that had not complied with the notice-and-comment procedures established by the
APA on the grounds that it undermined the deliberative process by failing to comply with
those procedures); Thomas Jefferson Univ., 512 U.S. at 525 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing
that “giving substantive effect to such a hopelessly vague regulation . . . disserves the very
purpose behind the delegation of lawmaking power to administrative agencies, which is to
‘resol[ve] . . . ambiguity in a statutory text’” (second and third alterations in original)
(quoting BethEnergy Mines, 501 U.S. at 696)).  Neither dissenting opinion suggested a
departure from Seminole Rock. See Guernsey Mem’l Hosp., 514 U.S. at 108 (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting) (“I take seriously our obligation to defer to an agency’s reasonable interpreta-
tion of its own regulations . . . .”); Thomas Jefferson Univ., 512 U.S. at 525 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (dissenting on the grounds that the agency interpretation at issue, rather than
Seminole Rock, was unreasonable).
68 See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (observing that “[b]ecause the salary-
basis test is a creature of the Secretary’s own regulations, his interpretation of it is, under
our jurisprudence, controlling unless ‘plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation’”
(emphasis added) (quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414
(1945))).
69 Id. at 462 (alteration in original) (quoting Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488
U.S. 204, 212 (1988)).
70 Id.
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measure of flexibility to the manner in which an agency could establish that
an interpretation was reasonable.71  While Auer reaffirmed the Court’s com-
mitment to Seminole Rock, the next fourteen years of Seminole Rock’s life were
marked by ebbs and flows, rather than the steady expansion that had been
the hallmark of the first fifty years of its existence.
2. The Minor Retractions of the Expanding Seminole Rock Doctrine
While Auer may have suggested that the propriety of Seminole Rock was a
settled matter, the Court continued to wrestle with the proper circumstances
in which to apply the doctrine.  Three years later, in Christensen v. Harris
County, the Court, for the first and only time, declined to apply Seminole Rock
to an agency interpretation of a regulation on the ground that the interpreta-
tion was plainly erroneous.72  In part, the Court determined that the regula-
tion was simply not ambiguous.73  The Court refused to defer to an opinion
letter interpreting a permissive regulation as a mandatory one, and it
observed that such deference would allow an agency “under the guise of
interpreting a regulation, to create de facto a new regulation.”74  Six years
later in Gonzales v. Oregon, the Court held that deference to an agency inter-
pretation was not warranted when it was simply a “parroting regulation,” as
any ambiguity in the regulation was due to the ambiguity in the statute.75
In Christensen and Gonzales, the Court limited the expanding reach of
Seminole Rock in two critical ways.  First, the Court determined that an agency
could not earn deference by imposing an ambiguity on a regulation.76  Sec-
ond, the Court determined that an agency could not resolve an ambiguity in
a statute by issuing parroting regulations and interpreting the regulations
71 Originally, the Court required that the interpretation not be “plainly erroneous or
inconsistent with the regulation.” Seminole Rock, 325 U.S. at 414.  In later applications of
Seminole Rock, the Court gave great weight to consistently applied interpretations. See Udall
v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 17 (1965).  The requirement that an interpretation “reflect the
agency’s fair and considered judgment on the matter in question,” by its terms, does not
impose any procedural requirements on the agency.  That is, as long as the agency can
satisfy the Court that its interpretation represents its “fair and considered judgment,” there
appear to be no obligations regarding the manner or method in which the interpretation
is presented—such as a public memorandum or interpretive rule.
72 See Christensen v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S. 576, 588 (2000) (characterizing the agency’s
position as inconsistent with the regulation’s “obvious meaning”).
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 546 U.S. 243, 256–57 (2006) (finding that Seminole Rock deference was “inapplicable
. . . [because] [t]he language the Interpretive Rule addresse[d] c[ame] from Congress, not
the Attorney General, and the near equivalence of the statute and regulation belie[d] the
Government’s argument for [Seminole Rock] deference”).
76 This prevents an agency from imposing an ambiguity on a regulation and then
interpreting the ambiguity to create an essentially “new” regulation.  Otherwise, the agency
could manufacture complete regulatory regimes, by virtue of some linguistic gymnastics,
without having to comply with the burdensome notice-and-comment provisions of the
APA.
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rather than the statute.77  While these decisions may have suggested a slow,
but steady, departure from the expansive reach of Seminole Rock, a series of
cases on the heels of Gonzales suggested that the indications of its demise
were greatly exaggerated.78  In short, the Court’s decisions in the five years
following Gonzales strongly suggested that it remained committed to the Semi-
nole Rock principle.
C. The Growing Discomfort With Seminole Rock
In a case where the majority employed an otherwise unremarkable appli-
cation of Seminole Rock deference,79 Justice Scalia wrote a concurring opinion
in Talk America, Inc. v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co., expressing his growing
doubts regarding the validity of Seminole Rock.80  He noted that it appeared to
be “a natural corollary . . . of the rule that we will defer to an agency’s inter-
pretation of the statute it is charged with implementing.”81  However, he
argued that Seminole Rock presented very different separation-of-powers con-
cerns than Chevron.
When Congress enacts an imprecise statute that it commits to the implemen-
tation of an executive agency, it has no control over that implementation
(except, of course, through further, more precise, legislation).  The legisla-
tive and executive functions are not combined.  But when an agency promul-
gates an imprecise rule, it leaves to itself the implementation of that rule, and
thus the initial determination of the rule’s meaning.  And though the adop-
tion of a rule is an exercise of the executive rather than the legislative power,
a properly adopted rule has fully the effect of law.  It seems contrary to fun-
damental principles of separation of powers to permit the person who
promulgates a law to interpret it as well.
. . . .
Deferring to an agency’s interpretation of a statute does not encourage
Congress, out of a desire to expand its power, to enact vague statutes; the
vagueness effectively cedes power to the Executive.  By contrast, deferring to
an agency’s interpretation of its own rule encourages the agency to enact
77 By issuing regulations that closely mirror an ambiguous organic statute, an agency
could avoid a significantly contested notice-and-comment period and then issue interpreta-
tions resolving the relevant ambiguity—interpretations that would not be subject to notice
and comment. Gonzales forecloses this specific opportunity for agency abuse.
78 See, e.g., Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Se. Alaska Conservation Council, 557 U.S. 261, 277–78
(2009) (deferring to an agency interpretation offered in an internal memorandum); Ken-
nedy v. Plan Adm’r for DuPont Sav. & Inv. Plan, 555 U.S. 285, 295–96, 296 n.7 (2009)
(deferring to an agency interpretation that was both inconsistent with a prior interpreta-
tion of the same regulation and offered in a legal brief); Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v.
Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 169–71 (2007) (deferring to an agency interpretation that was incon-
sistent with a prior interpretation of the same regulation).
79 See Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 131 S. Ct. 2254, 2263–64 (2011).
80 Id. at 2266 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“It is comforting to know that I would reach the
Court’s result even without [Seminole Rock].  For while I have in the past uncritically
accepted that rule, I have become increasingly doubtful of its validity.”).
81 Id. (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)).
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vague rules which give it the power, in future adjudications, to do what it
pleases.82
Scalia further indicated that he would be receptive to reconsidering the Semi-
nole Rock doctrine in the future.83  His concurrence marked the first time in
nearly seventy years that anyone on the Court had questioned the doctrinal
foundations of Seminole Rock, and it has fundamentally changed the manner
in which the Court has approached questions of deference to agency con-
structions of their regulations.
It did not take the Court very long to revisit the issue of Seminole Rock
deference.  The next term, the Court decided Christopher v. SmithKline
Beecham Corp., which presented the question whether pharmaceutical sales
representatives were “outside salesmen,” as defined by the Department of
Labor (DOL) pursuant to its authority under the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA), and thus exempted from the FLSA’s overtime compensation
requirement.84  The DOL initially interpreted “outside salesman” to require
that the employee for whom an exemption is sought be directly involved in
the consummation of a transaction, which would bring pharmaceutical sales
representatives within the ambit of the “outside salesman” exemption.85
However, after the Court granted certiorari, the DOL issued a new interpre-
tation, requiring the employee to actually transfer title in order for the
employer to qualify for the exemption.86  The Court refused to defer to the
DOL’s interpretation on the grounds that it would constitute an “unfair sur-
prise,” which would “impose potentially massive liability on respondent for
conduct that occurred well before that interpretation was announced.”87
While there were no express suggestions that the Court reconsider Seminole
Rock, the tone of the opinion and the extended discussion of the rationale
behind deference to agency interpretations seemed to indicate a shift away
from the uncritical acceptance of Seminole Rock.
D. The Calls to Reconsider Seminole Rock
The next term, in Decker v. Northwest Environmental Defense Center,88 the
Court again addressed the question of judicial deference to agency interpre-
tations.  The minor fissures that had surfaced in the foundation of Seminole
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2161 (2012).
85 Id. at 2166.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 2167.  The Court expressed concern about the fairness of deferring to an
agency’s interpretation of a regulation that allows it to enforce a regulation against a party
without reasonable notice. See id. at 2168 (“It is one thing to expect regulated parties to
conform their conduct to an agency’s interpretations once the agency announces them; it
is quite another to require regulated parties to divine the agency’s interpretations in
advance or else be held liable when the agency announces its interpretations for the first
time in an enforcement proceeding and demands deference.”).
88 133 S. Ct. 1326 (2013).
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Rock after Talk America and SmithKline Beecham had now become fractures.
While the majority deferred to the EPA’s interpretation of its Industrial
Stormwater Rule,89 three Justices in two separate opinions indicated their
willingness to reconsider the Seminole Rock principle.90  In his concurrence,
Chief Justice Roberts—joined by Justice Alito—indicated that Justice Scalia’s
opinion “raise[d] serious questions about the principle set forth in [Seminole
Rock],” and stated that he would be willing “to reconsider that principle in an
appropriate case.”91
Justice Scalia questioned the doctrinal foundations of the Seminole Rock
principle and called on the Court to reconsider it, arguing that the cases
before the Court highlighted the primary concerns with Seminole Rock.92
Relying again on the argument that Seminole Rock “contravenes one of the
great rules of separation of powers,” he deconstructed the principal justifica-
tions—provided by the Court’s prior cases—for adherence to the Seminole
Rock principle.93  In particular, he rejected the arguments that (1) the
agency’s position as drafter of the rule gave it special insight into the admin-
istrative intent of the rule,94 and that (2) the special expertise possessed by
the agency in the administration of its “complex and highly technical regula-
tory program” made deference especially warranted.95  First, he argued that
an agency’s intent is irrelevant to the question of the regulation’s meaning—
for that, the Court must look to the text of the rules promulgated by the
agency.96  Second, he contended that the existence of highly technical
administrative programs led to the conclusion that agencies should make the
regulations, but it did not suggest that agencies should interpret the regula-
tions.97  As he concluded, Justice Scalia apparently offered a parting pitch to
Justice Thomas, borrowing without citation his language from Connecticut
National Bank v. Germain, writing that “[i]t is time for us to presume (to coin
a phrase) that an agency says in a rule what it means, and means in a rule
what it says there.”98  Two short years later, Justice Thomas would answer the
call.
89 Id. at 1337–38 (finding that “an agency’s interpretation need not be the [best] pos-
sible reading of a regulation,” especially when an “agency has been consistent in its”
interpretation).
90 Id. at 1338 (Roberts, C.J., concurring); id. at 1339 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
91 Id. at 1338 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
92 Id. at 1339 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
93 Id. at 1340–42.
94 Id. at 1340.
95 Id. (quoting Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994)).
96 Id. (“Whether governing rules are made by the national legislature or an adminis-
trative agency, we are bound by what they say, not by the unexpressed intention of those
who made them.”).
97 Id.
98 Id. at 1344; see also Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992) (“We
have stated time and again that courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what
it means and means in a statute what it says there.”).
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In Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Association, the Court considered whether the
Paralyzed Veterans doctrine was consistent with the APA.99 Paralyzed Veterans
required an agency to comply with notice-and-comment procedures when it
wished to issue a new interpretation that significantly revised a prior interpre-
tation of a regulation that had been previously adopted by the agency.100
The Court unanimously held that “[t]he Paralyzed Veterans doctrine [wa]s
contrary to the clear text of the APA’s rulemaking provisions, and it improp-
erly impose[d] on agencies an obligation beyond ‘the maximum procedural
requirements’ specified in the APA.”101  While the majority held that Para-
lyzed Veterans was inconsistent with the APA, the real fireworks came from the
trio of separately written concurrences by Justices Alito, Scalia, and Thomas.
Justice Alito wrote separately to note that Paralyzed Veterans was likely
“prompted by an understandable concern about the aggrandizement of the
power of administrative agencies” as a result of the Seminole Rock doctrine.102
Justice Scalia wrote separately to note the impact of the shifting landscape of
administrative law on the original design of the APA.103  In particular, he
argued that the exemption for interpretive rules from the APA’s notice-and-
comment provisions was designed to be a modest one in a world where
“courts, not agencies, w[ould] authoritatively resolve ambiguities in statutes
and regulations.”104  Instead, he argued that interpretive rules have become
a tool that an agency can use to advise and bind the public.105  In light of
these concerns, he concluded the best course was to abandon Seminole
Rock.106
Perhaps encouraged by Scalia’s parting words in Decker, Justice Thomas
critiqued the constitutional weaknesses underlying Seminole Rock deference,
arguing that the doctrine improperly “transfer[s] . . . judicial power to the
Executive Branch[ ]” and “amounts to an erosion of the judicial obligation to
serve as a ‘check’ on the political branches.”107  First, Justice Thomas argued
that the framers placed the judicial power—which was understood to include
99 Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1203 (2015).
100 Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579, 586 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
101 Mortg. Bankers, 135 S. Ct. at 1206 (quoting Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natu-
ral Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 524 (1978)).  For an explanation of the rulemak-
ing process and the relevant exemptions, see supra notes 19–20.
102 Mortg. Bankers, 135 S. Ct. at 1210 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
103 Id. at 1211–13 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
104 Id. at 1211.
105 Id. at 1212.
106 Id. at 1213.
107 Id. at 1217 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).  Justice Thomas observed that
the Court has long claimed that the separation of powers and the constitutional structure
of checks and balances are vital to the protection of individual liberty, while endorsing a
more flexible approach when it seemed practical. Id. at 1215 (citations omitted).  Giving
only lip service to these principles, he said, “runs the risk of compromising our constitu-
tional structure” as “the Framers . . . [believed] [t]hey were practical and real protections
for individual liberty in the new Constitution.” Id. at 1215–16 (citing Mistretta v. United
States, 488 U.S. 361, 426 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
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the power to resolve ambiguities in the law—in an independent judicial branch
to insulate them from political pressures.108  With respect to the executive
and legislative branches, the framers made an entirely different value judg-
ment—namely, these branches should be tied to, rather than insulated from,
political pressures.109  Because an agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous
regulation gives that regulation the force of law, these determinations are, he
argued, properly reserved for the exercise of the independent judgment of
the courts,110 and Seminole Rock improperly precludes them from exercising
this judgment.111
Second, he argued that Seminole Rock undermines the judicial “check” on
the political branches that the judiciary is obligated to exercise.112  Revisiting
the settled principle that “a law repugnant to the constitution is void,”113
Thomas argued that the framers expected Article III judges to exercise the
judicial “check” against executive and legislative actions that were contrary to
law.114  In particular, he argued that this check had not been consistently
exercised with respect to administrative interpretations, which allowed “pre-
cisely the accumulation of governmental powers that the Framers warned
against.”115  The concentrations of power permitted under Seminole Rock
“allow[ ] agencies to change the meaning of regulations at their discretion
and without any advance notice to the parties.”116  As Justice Thomas rightly
suggests, the heightened potential for these types of agency abuses, and the
attendant likelihood that agencies will take advantage of opportunities to
reinterpret previously settled regulations, renders it all the more important
that the Court reconsider Seminole Rock.  Given the likelihood that the Court
will soon have an opportunity to do so, the next Part considers the justifica-
tions for and against Seminole Rock.
II. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR AND AGAINST SEMINOLE ROCK DEFERENCE
In light of the concerns raised regarding Seminole Rock, this Part consid-
ers the relative strengths and weaknesses of judicial deference to agency
interpretations.  While the concerns implicated by particular agency interpre-
tations are fact-intensive, this Part highlights the particular concerns raised
by Mortgage Bankers—the reinterpretation of a previously settled administra-
tive ambiguity—as this could be the form the controversy takes the next time
the Supreme Court addresses the question.  Nevertheless, the concerns asso-
ciated with Seminole Rock are largely the same regardless of the form that the
agency interpretation takes.  This Part will first address the arguments gener-
108 Id. at 1217–18.
109 Id. at 1218–19.
110 Id. at 1219.
111 Id.
112 Id. at 1220–21.
113 Id. at 1220 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803)).
114 Id.
115 Id. at 1221.
116 Id.
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ally advanced in favor of Seminole Rock and consider their general merits, and
then it will address the common arguments in opposition to Seminole Rock.
A. Rationales for Seminole Rock Deference
While the Seminole Rock Court provided no rationale for its principle of
deference, the Court and the legal community have offered two primary
arguments in support of Seminole Rock deference.  First, agencies should be
given deference because they have special insight into the original intent of
their regulations.  Second, because agencies administer highly technical reg-
ulatory programs requiring specialized knowledge, they are best situated to
explain the meaning and purpose of their regulations.  Each argument is
considered in turn.
1. The Special Insight of Agencies
A frequently cited justification for Seminole Rock deference is that agen-
cies are in a better position to know the original intent of their regula-
tions.117  Essentially, because the agency promulgates the regulations, the
agency would be “in a better position . . . to reconstruct the purpose of the
regulations in question.”118  This presumption arises because of the agency’s
“historical familiarity” with the reasons for adopting the regulatory text.119
The rationale supporting this presumption suggests that interpretations
offered closest to when the regulations were promulgated and interpreta-
tions by the original drafter would be more deserving of deference.120  While
the agency’s intent is certainly more persuasive when the administrative inter-
pretations have been issued by the authoring agency, “[a]uthorship [ha]s not
[been] an essential predicate to deference under Seminole Rock.”121  Moreover,
the Court has on occasion been willing to defer to an agency interpretation
that was inconsistent with an interpretation given closer to the time when the
regulations were promulgated.122  Despite these exceptions, an agency’s spe-
cial insight seems to carry the most weight when the authoring agency issues
117 See Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144, 152–53
(1991).  To discern this intent, it has been suggested that courts utilize pre-promulgation
documents, or the administrative history, to help resolve regulatory ambiguities. See Scott
H. Angstreich, Shoring Up Chevron: A Defense of Seminole Rock Deference to Agency Regulatory
Interpretations, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 49, 147–48 (2000).
118 Martin, 499 U.S. at 152.
119 Id. at 153.
120 See Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 12, at 1454–55.
121 Manning, supra note 13, at 630 n.104 (emphasis added) (noting that the Court had
previously deferred to agency interpretations of regulations it did not adopt (citing Arkan-
sas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 109–14 (1992))).
122 See Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 170–71 (2007) (deferring
to an agency interpretation that was inconsistent with an interpretation adopted closer in
time to the promulgation of the regulation).
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an interpretation that is contemporaneous with the promulgation of the reg-
ulations at issue.123
Relying on an agency’s special insight to resolve an ambiguity improp-
erly ignores the purpose of the notice-and-comment procedures—the admin-
istrative law analogue to bicameralism and presentment.124  Notice-and-
comment procedures ensure that legally binding obligations are not hastily
imposed on affected parties, and they subject regulations to a rigorous pro-
cess of extended debate and analysis before imbuing them with the force and
effect of law.125  Final regulations are necessarily the product of extended
debate, political maneuvering, and compromise—not a singular administra-
tive purpose.  For this reason, “[w]hether governing rules are made by the
national legislature or an administrative agency, we are bound by what they
say, not by the unexpressed intention of those who made them.”126  The reg-
ulatory text, not the administrative intent, must survive notice and comment.
Scouring pre-promulgation documents to divine an agency’s intent is little
more than glorified conjecture.127  Giving weight to such conjecture ignores
the reality that there is often strong disagreement about the import of the
enacted regulatory text.128  It is, therefore, irrelevant whether the agency
interpretation is issued contemporaneously by the drafting agency, as the
issue is limited to the meaning of the regulatory text.  Agencies are certainly
empowered to offer interpretations of their regulations.  However, when
those interpretations are contested, their interpretation is not the final word,
as “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say
what the law is.”129
123 See Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 12, at 1454.
124 See Manning, supra note 13, at 651 (arguing that the “process values served by
bicameralism and presentment . . . would be illusory if Congress could transfer its lawmak-
ing powers to agents fully under its control”).
125 Cf. id. at 649–50 (observing that the bicameral-and-presentment requirements,
which serve similar functions to the notice-and-comment procedures, serve three impor-
tant liberty-preserving functions: (1) making laws harder to pass also makes bad laws
harder to pass, (2) they promote caution and deliberation, and (3) they produce the nec-
essary circumstances for open and robust debate).
126 Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1340 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
127 But see Angstreich, supra note 117, at 147–48 (arguing that pre-promulgation mater-
ials could be used to determine “the original administrative intent of an ambiguous regula-
tion”).  While administrative history may not suffer from the same flaws identified with
legislative history, this approach still places an inappropriate emphasis on the agency’s
intended meaning, which is not subject to notice and comment.
128 See ERNEST A. YOUNG, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE
121–22 (2012) (observing that Alexander Hamilton believed that implied constitutional
powers provided the basis for a Bank of the United States while James Madison believed
that chartering the bank was beyond Congress’s limited and enumerated powers).
129 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (emphasis added).
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2. Institutional Competence
Another justification offered for Seminole Rock deference is that an
agency’s judgment should not be subject to unnecessary judicial scrutiny due
to its unique expertise in administering a highly technical regulatory
regime.130  Given the inherent complexities attendant to a complex regula-
tory scheme, along with the interdependence of many regulatory provisions,
it may be preferable to let the “expert agencies” resolve regulatory ambigui-
ties over the “generalist courts.”131  This argument is about the relative insti-
tutional competence between administrative agencies and the courts, and the
outcome of the analysis largely depends on how the interpretive inquiry is
framed.  For instance, if the resolution of a regulatory ambiguity is framed as
an inquiry into the meaning of a regulation, the issue is whether courts or
agencies are better suited to determining the meaning of the regulatory
text.132  However, if resolving a regulatory ambiguity is framed as a policy
choice, the inquiry boils down to whether politically accountable agencies or
an independent judiciary should be making policy choices.133  Regardless of
how the interpretive inquiry is framed, it is important to consider the relative
merits of placing the authority to resolve ambiguities in either administrative
agencies or the courts.
If the interpretive inquiry is framed as an inquiry into the meaning of
the regulatory text and, consequently, an assessment of the validity of the
agency’s interpretation, there is significant reason to believe that the courts
are at least as effective as agencies in undertaking such a task.134  Regardless,
determining the meaning of the law135 is a task for the judicial power of the
United States, which is vested in the judicial branch.136  It is without question
that agencies are permitted to interpret regulatory ambiguities—indeed, it is
130 See Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994) (finding deference
necessary when a “regulation concerns ‘a complex and highly technical regulatory pro-
gram,’ in which the identification and classification of relevant ‘criteria necessarily require
significant expertise and entail the exercise of judgment grounded in policy concerns.’”
(quoting Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 697 (1991))).
131 Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 12, at 1456.
132 See Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1222 (2015) (Thomas, J., concur-
ring in the judgment) (“The proper question faced by courts in interpreting a regulation is
not what the best policy choice might be, but what the regulation means. . . . Judges are at
least as well suited as administrative agencies to engage in this task”).
133 See Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 12, at 1456–57 (suggesting that policy
choices may be better left for politically accountable agencies rather than insulated
judges).
134 See supra note 132.
135 For all intents and purposes, regulations accorded deference are laws. See Mortg.
Bankers, 135 S. Ct. at 1212 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).  Once promulgated,
they have the force and effect of law. Id. Parties electing to disobey regulations are no less
subject to sanction than those electing to disobey statutes. Id.  The power to say what the
law is, then, rests with the courts when deciding the meaning of regulations, just as it
would when deciding the meaning of statutes.
136 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
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expected that agencies will clarify ambiguities that arise in the course of
enforcing their regulatory program.137  However, the expectation that agen-
cies, in the course of implementing their regulations, will sometimes need to
issue clarifying interpretations of those regulations does not divest the courts
of their constitutionally assigned obligation to determine the meaning of the
law.  The final word about the meaning of the law—whether it takes the form
of a statute or regulation—rests with the courts, not agencies.
If, instead, the interpretive inquiry is framed as a policy choice, there is
reason to believe that the politically accountable agency, rather than insu-
lated courts, should resolve the regulatory ambiguity.138  The assumption,
however, that any resolution of a regulatory ambiguity involves a policy
choice is flawed.  This characterization conflates a policy choice with some-
thing having policy implications.139  That a judicial determination of a regu-
lation could have an effect on policy is neither unexpected nor
problematic.140  If every resolution of a regulatory ambiguity were a policy
choice reserved for an agency’s final determination, it is hard to imagine a
role for the courts in evaluating the validity of an agency’s interpretation.141
That simply cannot be right.  While it is the agency that is empowered by
Congress to make policy choices, the agency’s policy choices should be
reflected in the regulatory text, not its subsequent interpretations.  Moreo-
ver, interpretations of regulatory ambiguities should clarify a regulation
rather than create a new one.  Allowing agencies to utilize these ambiguities
as policymaking devices gives them license to capitalize on interpretive rules’
exemption from the APA and create binding regulations without adhering to
137 See Manning, supra note 13, at 687–90 (suggesting that agencies would continue to
interpret their regulations under a regime of independent judicial review and noting that
if their interpretations were contested they would have to justify them before a reviewing
court).
138 See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
139 Every decision by a court has an effect on the scope and the contours of a statute,
but its decisions are only referred to as policymaking—in the pejorative, Lochner-esque
sense of that term—when it ventures far beyond the limits of reasoned decisionmaking in
which courts ordinarily engage.  While not without their flaws, courts have a longstanding
history of engaging in principled judicial review of statutory programs while according
Congress’s legislative judgment its due respect.  Labeling every decision made by a court
that could impact a regulatory program a “policy choice” reserved for politically accounta-
ble agencies conveniently excuses courts from performing their constitutionally assigned
role and, ironically, insulates the agency from any accountability.
140 Even assuming that courts faithfully adhere to “Skidmore’s admonition to respect
persuasive agency expositions of meaning,” it is axiomatic that “some ambiguity is inevita-
ble,” so “a post-Seminole Rock world would sometimes require courts to make interpretive
policy judgments now reserved for relatively accountable administrative agencies.”  Man-
ning, supra note 13, at 691.
141 After all, courts are not supposed to make policy—that is reserved for the politically
accountable branches.  Any determination by a court that an agency interpretation is inva-
lid would, under this reasoning, be an impermissible intrusion into the province of the
political branches.  But this would render meaningless the judiciary’s check against the
excesses of the legislative and executive branches.
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the liberty-preserving notice-and-comment procedures.  Finally, even if it is
assumed that resolving a regulatory ambiguity is always a policy choice, there
is no constitutional basis for precluding the courts from their duty to inde-
pendently determine the meaning of the law and to serve as a “check
[against] the excesses of [the] political branches.”142
B. Concerns Presented by Seminole Rock Deference
While it is uncontroversial to suggest that the judicial power rests in the
judicial branch, proponents of Seminole Rock instead point to efficiency as
justification for retaining its principle of deference.143  However, the primary
arguments offered against Seminole Rock are that it violates the constitutional
principle of separation of powers and permits agencies to bypass a meaning-
ful notice-and-comment period by promulgating regulations with ambiguities
they can later resolve with binding interpretations.  Each argument is consid-
ered in turn.
1. Separation of Powers
The Constitution contemplates a meaningful separation between the
legislative and interpretive functions of the political branches.144  While the
framers did not intend that the branches be entirely separate,145 they sought
142 See Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1220 (2015) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring in the judgment).  In Mortgage Bankers, Justice Thomas discusses and rejects the argu-
ment, discussed briefly by Professor Manning, that Congress implicitly delegates
interpretive authority to the agency because of its familiarity with the regulations and
unique expertise. See id. at 1224 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment); Manning,
supra note 13, at 630 & n.107; cf. Angstreich, supra note 117, at 112–50 (arguing that
Seminole Rock should be retained to give effect to Chevron).  Thomas notes that Congress
cannot delegate power to an agency that it does not possess. See Mortg. Bankers, 135 S. Ct.
at 1224 (quoting Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726 (1986)).  While Congress has the
power to delegate policymaking authority to the agency, which is subject to judicial review,
it does not have the authority to delegate final interpretive authority to agencies.  There-
fore, any implication that Congress delegated judicially binding interpretive authority is
void, as Congress cannot delegate power it does not have.
143 See, e.g., Angstreich, supra note 117, at 113–28 (rationalizing retention of Seminole
Rock on the basis of various efficiency costs, such as the social costs of additional regulatory
clarity, higher costs of individual determinations, costs of promulgating and enforcing the
new regulations, and signification transitional costs).
144 See Manning, supra note 13, at 638–44 (reviewing the separation-of-powers doctrine
in the context of Chevron and Seminole Rock).  For a more robust treatment of the separa-
tion of powers doctrine, see id. at 631–54.  Scott Angstreich also provides a helpful sum-
mary of the separation-of-powers concerns attendant to Seminole Rock. See Angstreich, supra
note 117, at 110–11.
145 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, supra note 2, at 245 (arguing that “unless these depart-
ments be so far connected and blended as to give to each a constitutional control over the
others, the degree of separation . . . essential to a free government, can never in practice
be duly maintained”).
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to prevent the centralization of power in any one branch.146  Professor Man-
ning observes that the framers took special care to “limit Congress’s direct
control over the instrumentalities that implement its laws,” which he argues
was accomplished by limiting the legislative influence over the compensation
and election of the President and by insulating the judiciary.147  From case
law and the separation-of-powers tradition, Manning argues that if Congress
fails to clearly articulate its policies during bicameralism and presentment, “it
does so only at the price of forfeiting its power of policy specification to a
separate expositor beyond its immediate control.”148 Chevron is consistent
with this understanding, but Seminole Rock is not.149  Under Chevron, when
Congress passes an ambiguous statute, the agency is charged with the inde-
pendent authority to interpret the ambiguous legal text.150  Thus, there is
separation between the lawmaker (Congress) and the interpreter (the
agency).151  Under Seminole Rock, however, the agency is empowered to both
promulgate the regulation and interpret any ambiguities in the regulatory
text.152  This is the very “accumulation of all powers . . . in the same hands”
that concerned the framers.153
The question remains whether the centralization of rulemaking author-
ity in agency hands meaningfully implicates the framers’ concerns.  While
Seminole Rock violates the separation-of-powers principle, some scholars have
argued that the degree of interference with constitutional values is not signif-
icant enough to outweigh the gains in efficient governance by agencies in
dire need of more resources and flexibility.154  In that case, the question is
whether the efficiency gains of a doctrine, such as Seminole Rock, can ever
overcome constitutional infirmity.  Assuming that at least some constitutional
inconsistency is permitted when the harms are insignificant, the inquiry
would, to one degree or another, become a balancing of interests—fidelity to
the Constitution on one end and the practical necessities of administrative
governance on the other.  This balancing, however, misstates the relevant
inquiry.  Constitutional principles are not balanced against efficiency consid-
erations—where these values collide, the constitutional principles always pre-
146 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 239 (James Madison) (Lawrence Goldman ed., 2008)
(arguing that “[t]he accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the
same hands . . . may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny”).
147 Manning, supra note 13, at 641–42.
148 Id. at 654.
149 See id.  According to Manning, “Seminole Rock leaves in place no independent inter-
pretive check on lawmaking by an administrative agency.” Id. at 639.
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 Id. at 639–40.
153 THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, supra note 146, at 239.
154 See Angstreich, supra note 117, at 113–28 (discussing the costs of abandoning Semi-
nole Rock); see also Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 12, at 1459–60 (summarizing the
pragmatic arguments in favor of Seminole Rock—namely, improved efficiency and
flexibility).
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vail.155  Within constitutional limits, agencies should seek efficient regulatory
programs.156  However, the inefficiencies that attend our current govern-
mental structure were intentionally created by the framers to protect individ-
ual liberty.157  Thus, it is of little relevance that Seminole Rock enables agencies
to operate more efficiently, as the concentration of government powers it
allows is the “very definition of tyranny.”158
2. Agency Gamesmanship
Seminole Rock removes important incentives for agencies to promulgate
sufficiently clear regulations.159  Because interpretive rules are exempt from
the notice-and-comment procedures of the APA,160 an agency may avoid the
hassle of notice and comment by promulgating regulations with ambiguous
provisions to be filled in later with interpretive rules.161  As long as an inter-
pretation is not “plainly erroneous,” a court will not disturb it.162  Moreover,
an agency can utilize deference in several potentially abusive ways,163 and
Mortgage Bankers provided one such example.  Under the Fair Labor Stan-
155 See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 426–27 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the degree of commingling of powers may be appropriate for consideration
“at the margins,” but that it was “far from a marginal question whether our constitutional
structure allows for a body which is not the Congress . . . making . . . rules that have the
effect of laws”); see also Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1217 (2015)
(Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing that the Court has an obligation to
guard against deviations from the principles of the Constitution).
156 This accords with Professor Manning’s argument that the Court should substitute
the Skidmore principle for Seminole Rock deference.  He argues that Skidmore is readily
adapted to assessing agency interpretations of their regulations because it reflects due
respect for the agency’s technical expertise and insight. See Manning, supra note 13, at
618–19.  These are quintessentially efficiency-related concerns.
157 See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 426 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that the framers deter-
mined the preferred amount of commingling of powers, presumably to protect liberty).
158 THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, supra note 146, at 239; see also Martin H. Redish & Elizabeth
J. Cisar, “If Angels Were to Govern”: The Need for Pragmatic Formalism in Separation of Powers
Theory, 41 DUKE L.J. 449, 453 (1991) (arguing that “the separation of powers provisions of
the Constitution are tremendously important . . . because the fears of creeping tyranny that
underlie them are at least as justified today as they were at the time the Framers established
them”).
159 See supra notes 15–21 and accompanying text.
160 See supra notes 20–21 and accompanying text.
161 See supra notes 17–21 and accompanying text.
162 Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 U.S. 1199, 1212 (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment) (“Of course an interpretive rule must meet certain conditions before it gets
deference . . . but once it does so it is every bit as binding as a substantive rule.  So the
point stands: By deferring to interpretive rules, we have allowed agencies to make binding
rules unhampered by notice-and-comment procedures.”).
163 An agency can interpret a regulatory text well after the rule was promulgated, it can
promulgate regulations with ambiguities provisions to be resolved by later interpretations,
or it can reinterpret a regulatory provision with a previously settled meaning.  Assuming
these interpretations are “reasonable,” the agency receives binding deference. See supra
note 162 and accompanying text.
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dards Act of 1938 (“FLSA” or the “Act”), the DOL was delegated the responsi-
bility to promulgate regulations to determine employee qualifications for
“administrative exemptions,” which would free employers from overtime pay
requirements for those employees.164  In 2006, the Mortgage Bankers Associ-
ation (MBA) sought the opinion of the DOL regarding the status of certain
mortgage-loan officers,165 and the DOL determined that the mortgage-loan
officers qualified for the exemption.166  In 2010, just four years later, the
DOL changed course and concluded that these same officers no longer qual-
ified for the exemption.167  While the Court did not opine on or apply Semi-
nole Rock, these facts raised genuine concerns among some of the Justices
regarding the consequences of binding deference to agency interpreta-
tions,168 and these concerns will likely persist until the Court either aban-
dons Seminole Rock or significantly limits its reach.
To be sure, Seminole Rock provides certain efficiency-related benefits to
agencies and regulated parties.169  However, efficiency-based principles are
secondary to the liberty-protecting values built into the Constitution.170
While the resolution of regulatory ambiguities may be considered policy
choices reserved for politically accountable agencies, this does not justify the
conclusion that Congress delegated final interpretive authority to agen-
cies.171  As previously discussed, the judicial power of the United States is
vested in the judicial branch, and courts are obliged, when necessary, to util-
ize their judicial check to protect against the excesses of the other
branches.172  Permitting the agency to exercise each of the different govern-
164 Mortg. Bankers, 135 S. Ct. at 1204 (quotations omitted).
165 Id. at 1205.
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 See id. at 1210–11 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(noting his concerns with Seminole Rock and indicating an interest to address the doctrine
after proper briefing and argument); id. at 1211–13 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judg-
ment) (arguing that interpretive rules’ exemption from notice and comment establishes a
far different balance between power and procedure than what was contemplated under
the APA, and concluding that Seminole Rock should be abandoned); id. at 1213 (Thomas, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (indicating that the line of precedents beginning with Semi-
nole Rock was based on questionable principles).
169 See Manning, supra note 13, at 616–17 (“Viewed in isolation, Seminole Rock may be an
understandable reaction to the exigencies of modern regulatory governance; it cuts agen-
cies helpful interpretive slack in a world in which life is short, resources are limited, and
agencies must address complex issues that have unpredictable twists and turns.”); Decker v.
Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1341 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part) (noting that one practical benefit of Seminole Rock is that it reduces the likeli-
hood of extended delay in determining the meaning of an ambiguous regulation).
170 See Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1342 (arguing that “however great may be the efficiency
gains derived from [Seminole Rock] deference, beneficial effect cannot justify a rule that not
only has no principled basis but contravenes one of the great rules of separation of powers:
He who writes a law must not adjudge its violation”).
171 See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
172 See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
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mental powers is tantamount to ratifying a governmental structure directly at
odds with constitutional principles.  This structure enables enterprising agen-
cies to serve as lawmaker and judge of their regulatory regime.173  In the
words of Justice Scalia: “Enough is enough.”174  The Court should move
quickly to provide an independent judicial check on agency interpretations
of their regulations.  The contours of that independent check are considered
in the next Part.
III. NAVIGATING THE ROAD AHEAD
As the influence of administrative agencies reaches into our daily lives,
the concentration of governmental powers in administrative hands is
immensely troubling.175  Given the heightened potential for infringements
against personal liberty interests,176 it seems abundantly clear that the Court
should revise its approach to agency interpretations of their regulations.  Pro-
fessor Manning argues, and this Note largely agrees, that the Court should
impose an independent judicial check on agency interpretations of their reg-
ulatory ambiguities.177  In addition, Manning claims that the Skidmore princi-
ple provides the proper constitutional balance for evaluating agency
decisionmaking.178  While the Skidmore principle promises the middle
ground of an independent judicial check with an appropriate consideration
for agency expertise and experience, the principle appears to operate in a
manner identical to de novo review.  Given the potential for confusion from
the indefinite Skidmore principle, the Court should utilize de novo review to
evaluate agency interpretations of their regulations.
A. Abandoning Seminole Rock Deference for an Independent Judicial Check
The Constitution is “a framework[ ] for the conduct of government.”179
In that document, the framers determined “how much commingling [of gov-
ernmental powers] was . . . acceptable” within our constitutional structure.180
Because that structure was designed to disperse power as a liberty-preserving
mechanism, efforts to discard it “on the basis of currently perceived utility
173 See Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1342 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
174 Id. at 1339.
175 Some scholars argue that the administrative state is unlawful, which would make this
concentration of powers even more concerning. See Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the
Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1231 (1994) (arguing that “[t]he post-New
Deal administrative state is unconstitutional”); see generally PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINIS-
TRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? (2014).
176 See Philip B. Kurland, The Rise and Fall of the “Doctrine” of Separation of Powers, 85
MICH. L. REV. 592, 601 (1986) (observing that “[t]he doctrine [of separation of powers]
has afforded less and less adequate protection for the individual as government has grown
into the Leviathan it has become”).
177 Manning, supra note 13, at 618–19.
178 Id. at 618.
179 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 426 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
180 Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\91-2\ndl207.txt unknown Seq: 27  1-FEB-16 9:50
2015] the  curious  case  of S E M I N O L E R O C K 841
will be disastrous.”181  Thus, the doctrines of deference must be evaluated for
consistency with our constitutional structure.182  While there is doubt and
disagreement on the matter, there is a modern consensus that Chevron can be
conceptually reconciled under constitutional principles.183  Congress passes
a law and delegates the execution of that law to an administrative agency,
recognizing “that a certain degree of discretion, and thus of lawmaking,
inheres in most executive . . . action, and it is up to Congress, by the relative
specificity or generality of its statutory commands, to determine—up to a
point—how small or how large that degree shall be.”184  A reviewing court
satisfies its obligation to provide an independent judicial check by accepting
an agency’s reasonable exercise of discretion within the bounds provided by
Congress.185
Assuming that an agency’s resolution of a regulatory ambiguity is poli-
cymaking,186 the operative premise behind Seminole Rock becomes problem-
atic—it presumes that the delegation of “lawmaking authority implicitly
carries with it a concomitant power of law-exposition,”187 and it prevents
reviewing courts from disturbing agency interpretations that are not “plainly
erroneous.”  This fails to adhere to the constitutional structure in two impor-
tant respects.  At a minimum, Seminole Rock allows the power to make the law
and the final authority to say what it means to be placed in the same hands,
and it strips the judicial branch of their obligation to serve as a check against
the excesses of the legislative and executive branches.  As previously dis-
cussed, this structure is often justified by reference to an agency’s technical
expertise in administering a highly technical and complex regulatory
scheme.  This incorrectly presumes that the primary inquiry should be to
determine the institution most capable of making the best decisions.188  The
181 Id. at 427.
182 See Manning, supra note 13, at 637.  After evaluating the importance of constitu-
tional structure to the interpretation of ambiguities in statutory text, Professor Manning
concludes: “[I]f a court must assign meaning to an agency-ordaining or agency-regulating
statute in the face of legislative indeterminacy, it should presume, absent a clear indication
to the contrary, that the statute opts for arrangements that best conform to the basic struc-
tural commitments of our constitutional scheme of government.”  Id.
183 See id. at 623 (arguing that Chevron adopts a categorical presumption that silence by
Congress is an implied delegation of authority to an agency); Stephenson & Pogoriler,
supra note 12, at 1449–50 (noting that Chevron “is grounded in a presumption . . . about
congressional intent”); see also Angstreich, supra note 117, at 110–11 (reviewing Professor
Manning’s argument about Chevron).
184 Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 417 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
185 Manning, supra note 13, at 627.
186 See supra notes 138–42 and accompanying text.
187 Manning, supra note 13, at 682.
188 For example, assume that a federal judge has over thirty years of experience as an
Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) prosecuting all types of drug-trafficking offenses.
If the judge were to come into possession of information tending to support probable
cause that a leader of a well-known drug cartel was involved in a conspiracy to engage in
drug trafficking, he could not bring the relevant charges himself—and he certainly could
not prosecute those charges and preside as judge simultaneously.  It is beyond doubt that
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\91-2\ndl207.txt unknown Seq: 28  1-FEB-16 9:50
842 notre dame law review [vol. 91:2
framers have already made decisions regarding institutional competence in
the Constitution itself,189 so the primary inquiry is to determine to whom the
Constitution has assigned the power to act.  To the extent that the Constitu-
tion does not directly prescribe the proper use of a government power, the
use of that power must be made consistent with our constitutional structure
before pragmatic considerations are addressed.190  While Seminole Rock can-
not be conceptually reconciled with our constitutional structure,191 it is
important to consider whether the concerns for agency abuse that it creates
are academic or practical in nature.
The concerns with Seminole Rock deference are more than academic.
The proliferation of the administrative state, with agencies that often concur-
rently exercise powers closely resembling those assigned to the legislative,
executive, and judicial branches, has significantly extended the reach of
administrative power.192  Allowing an agency to simultaneously exercise
these powers without any independent check threatens to subject regulated
parties—of whom there are many—to arbitrary governance.193  Some schol-
ars have argued that the solution to the concerns of arbitrary governance in a
Seminole Rock regime lie in imposing limitations on the doctrine designed to
avoid common agency abuses.194  These suggestions include adopting an
antiplaceholder principle,195 reserving deference for regulatory interpreta-
tions within formal orders,196 refusing to permit an agency to enforce a regu-
lation as interpreted against a party without notice,197 evaluating pre-
the judge’s thirty years of experience would make him as competent as many current AUSAs,
and it would be of little surprise if the judge were more competent.  However, the judge’s
capacity to handle the case is irrelevant.  The question is whether the judge has the authority
to bring the charges and prosecute the case simultaneously—which he clearly does not.
To be sure, there are important distinctions between the manner in which an agency
promulgates and interprets a regulation and the example of a judge exercising executive
and judicial powers simultaneously.  Nevertheless, this hypothetical structure bears an
uncomfortably close resemblance to the structure of regulatory governance permitted
under Seminole Rock.
189 Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 426 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
190 See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
191 See Manning, supra note 13, at 631 (noting that “Seminole Rock effectively unifies
lawmaking and law-exposition—a combination of powers decisively rejected by our consti-
tutional structure”).
192 See Kurland, supra note 176, at 601 (arguing that “[t]he doctrine [of separation of
powers] has afforded less and less adequate protection for the individual as government
has grown into the Leviathan it has become”).
193 See Manning, supra note 13, at 617 (arguing that Seminole Rock “contradicts a major
premise of our constitutional scheme and of contemporary separation-of-powers case
law—that a fusion of lawmaking and law-exposition is especially dangerous to our
liberties”).
194 Angstreich, supra note 117, at 145–47; Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 12, at
1467–71, 1481–96.
195 Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 12, at 1467–71.
196 Id. at 1481–96.
197 Angstreich, supra note 117, at 146.
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promulgation materials to ensure the interpretations are not contrivances,198
and, finally, stricter enforcement of the line between legislative rules or
amendments and interpretive rules.199  Each of these suggestions is compel-
ling in their own right, but they all embody a questionable assumption—
namely, that pragmatic and efficiency-related concerns may outweigh constitutional
concerns.  For all its merits, this assumption improperly orders our priorities
under the Constitution.200  Thus, the question is not whether we can suffi-
ciently fix an unconstitutional doctrine to retain efficiency gains, but
whether, once reconciled, a constitutional doctrine may be utilized to retain
certain efficiencies.  The first step is to ensure that the evaluation of agency
interpretations of their regulations is consistent with the constitutional struc-
ture.  Thus, it is imperative that the Court establishes an independent judicial
check against agency interpretations.  The next question is whether an inde-
pendent judicial check can be implemented in a manner that does not
entirely relinquish the efficiency benefits of Seminole Rock.
B. Skidmore Deference, Skidmore Weight, or Something Else?
Professor Manning argues that courts should evaluate agency interpreta-
tions of regulations under the Skidmore framework.201  Under this standard,
reviewing courts give weight to an agency’s interpretation of their regulations
on the basis of the “thoroughness evident in [the agency’s] consideration,
the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronounce-
ments, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to
control.”202  He argues that this approach is consistent with the separation-of-
powers requirements, as it provides an independent judicial check on agency
action.203  In addition, he contends that this standard of review recognizes
the potential benefits of an agency’s insight and experience during the inter-
pretive process.204  While the substance of Skidmore appears to provide an
appropriate balance for judicial review, its articulation suggests a standard
that appears either to be something more than de novo review or something
less than Seminole Rock deference.  It is not clear where Skidmore falls on this
continuum, nor is there a satisfactory guiding principle beyond the fact that
198 Id. at 147.
199 Id. at 145.
200 See supra notes 155–58 and accompanying text.
201 Manning, supra note 13, at 618.
202 Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (emphasis added).
203 Manning, supra note 13, at 618–19.  Manning offers two noteworthy explanations
for how Skidmore provides the requisite constitutional check for agency interpretations of
their regulations.  First, Skidmore provides an independent check by placing the burden of
persuasion upon an agency to convince a reviewing court of the meaning of the regulatory
text. Id. at 687.  Second, in addition to independence, Skidmore incentivizes clarity in both
the regulatory text and in interpretive explanations, which limits the potential for abusive
agency behavior. Id. at 687–88.  Each of these factors reconciles the review of an agency’s
regulatory interpretations with our constitutional structure.
204 Id. at 619.
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courts should consider “all those factors which give it power to persuade.”205
Given Skidmore’s potential for confusion, the Court should instead engage in
de novo review of agency interpretations.
While Professor Manning appears to carefully avoid referring to the stan-
dard announced in Skidmore as deference,206 the standard is often referred to
as just that—Skidmore deference.207  While this is sloppy nomenclature, it is
more than a semantically constructed issue.  Deference is defined as “submis-
sion to or compliance with the will . . . of another,”208 so that when a review-
ing court “defers” to an agency they are “yield[ing] respectfully [to the]
judgment or opinion”209 of that agency.  In practice, a reviewing court can
(1) refuse to inquire further, (2) accept an agency interpretation that is one
of two or more roughly equivalent, plausible interpretations, or (3) accept an
agency’s less persuasive, but reasonable, interpretation.  Regardless of the
form that deference takes, there is some submission to the will of another.
Skidmore, however, neither utilizes the language of deference nor does it
require a reviewing court to submit to, or comply with, an agency’s interpre-
tation.210  It does quite the opposite, recognizing that a court need not
accept an agency’s interpretation unless it is persuaded by the agency’s rea-
soned explanation.211  Correcting the terminology—to something like “Skid-
more weight”212—may more accurately describe the probative value of the
Skidmore principle, but it does not eliminate the potential for confusion.
Requiring that an agency persuade the reviewing court to accept their inter-
pretation not only fails to insist on “deference” in any meaningful sense, but
205 Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140; see United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 250 (2001)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that “totality-of-the-circumstances Skidmore deference is a
recipe for uncertainty, unpredictability, and endless litigation”); Christensen v. Harris Cty.,
529 U.S. 576, 589 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(arguing that “Skidmore deference” was “an anachronism”).
206 See Manning, supra note 13, at 618, 681, 690 (referring to Skidmore as a “framework,”
an “approach,” a “regime”). But see id. at 688 n.357 (referring to “Skidmore deference” in a
footnote).
207 See Mead, 533 U.S. at 250 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (using the phrase “Skidmore defer-
ence”); Christensen, 529 U.S. at 589 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (same); Peter L. Strauss, “Deference” is Too Confusing—Let’s Call Them “Chevron
Space” and “Skidmore Weight”, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1143, 1144–45 (2012) (noting that the
principle in Skidmore is referred to as Skidmore deference).
208 Deference, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/deference?s=t
(last visited Nov. 15, 2015) (defining deference as “respectful submission or yielding to the
judgment, opinion, will, etc., of another.”).
209 Defer, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/defer?s=t (last vis-
ited Nov. 15, 2015) (second listed definition for defer: “to yield respectfully in judgment or
opinion (usually followed by to)”).
210 Skidmore speaks in terms of things that have the “power to persuade, [yet] lack[ ]
[the] power to control.” See Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
211 See id.
212 See Strauss, supra note 207, at 1144–45 (2012) (arguing that “Skidmore weight” more
accurately describes the respective roles of the court and agency in a proceeding where the
court is exercising their final interpretive authority).
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it also appears to require the same showing from an agency that would be
required under traditional de novo review. Skidmore deference, then, is
essentially no deference at all.  However, declaring that a reviewing court
must give Skidmore deference suggests that the court is engaging in some-
thing less extensive than de novo review and more extensive than Seminole
Rock deference.  But where on that continuum Skidmore would fall is unclear,
and this indeterminacy risks inconsistent application among the lower courts.
In reality, the substance of Skidmore—the requirement that a court give
weight to a well-reasoned agency explanation—is no different from de novo
review.  In the interest of clarity, the Court should abandon Seminole Rock in
favor of de novo review.
CONCLUSION
While the doctrine of Chevron deference is rooted in our constitutional
structure, Seminole Rock deference has developed from little more than judi-
cially constructed dictum without a constitutional anchor.  That dictum, how-
ever, is the proverbial acorn that has grown into an oak tree.213  In its first
sixty-five years, Seminole Rock grew, with little resistance, from a modest doc-
trine of deference to a firmly entrenched doctrine of administrative law.  In
recent years the Court has become increasingly more uncomfortable with the
manner in which Seminole Rock permits essential government powers to be
exercised by the same hands.  That an agency can promulgate a regulation
with ambiguous provisions, issue an interpretation at a later time to resolve
the ambiguities, and receive binding deference from reviewing courts, is
troubling.  This problem has been amplified by the procedural exemptions
in the APA and the Court’s decision in Mortgage Bankers.  Interpretive rules
have long been exempt from the APA’s notice-and-comment procedures,
which allow an enterprising agency, in a Seminole Rock world, to minimize
their exposure to these difficult procedures.  Before Mortgage Bankers, once
an agency interpreted an ambiguity in a regulation, the agency was required
to subject any reinterpretations, which were treated as amendments under
the APA, to notice and comment.  After Mortgage Bankers, agencies are no
longer required to submit reinterpretations that significantly revise earlier
interpretations for notice and comment.  Thus, despite the Court’s growing
concern with the Seminole Rock doctrine, there are now more avenues in
which to invoke it.
While it is fair to conclude that resolving regulatory ambiguities is poli-
cymaking reserved for the politically accountable branches, it remains vitally
important to our constitutional structure to ensure that agency interpreta-
tions are not insulated from judicial review.  Adherence to the principles of
213 In 1975, then-Justice Rehnquist penned the “acorn-oak tree” analogy in the context
of implied private causes of action under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 and Rule 10b-5 of the SEC. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723,
737 (1975).  The analogy aptly describes the development of the Seminole Rock doctrine as
well.
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the Constitution is justified because its structural provisions disperse power
and preserve liberty, not because it ensures the most efficient governance.
While regulatory efficiency is important, it must be pursued within constitu-
tional limits.  For these reasons, the Court should abandon Seminole Rock and
review agency interpretations de novo, which will reconcile the modern
approach to judicial review of agency interpretations with the minimum
requirements of the separation-of-powers principle.  When engaging in judi-
cial review of an agency’s interpretation, it is important that courts avoid
imposing their policy preferences on the agency.  Nevertheless, as some
ambiguities inevitably inhere in even the most clearly written regulations,
courts will unavoidably shape policy in ever so small amounts—but this is,
and has always been, a necessary cost to the judicial department’s obligation
to “say what the law is.”  While this can be a tenuous balance to strike, it is a
balance the Court has long been able to maintain outside the world of
administrative law, and there is no reason to believe it cannot be maintained
within.
